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Did Credit Rating Agencies Make Unbiased Assumptions on CDOs? 
By JOHN M. GRIFFIN AND DRAGON YONGJUN TANG* 
Financial intermediaries are often in conflicting situations where large, short-term profits can 
be made by deviating from conventional standards. The frequency and severity of such 
deviations is a source of substantial disagreement. During the ‘dot-com’ period, equity analysts 
knowingly inflated their ratings on internet stocks that their banks underwrote and most large 
investment banks engaged in questionable IPO allocation practices (John M. Griffin, Jeffrey H. 
Harris, and Selim Topaloglu (2007)). However, other studies suggest that such behaviors are 
exceptions rather than the norm. For example, Hamid Mehran and Rene M. Stulz (2007, page 
293) summarize that “the academic literature on conflicts of interest, using large samples, 
reaches conclusions that are weaker and often more benign than the conclusions drawn by 
journalists and politicians.” The credit crisis provides a new testing ground for such debate. 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), a pool of debt securities sold to investors in 
prioritized tranches, are at the heart of the credit crisis of 2007-2009. The stellar growth of the 
CDO market before the crisis and its sudden collapse has stimulated vigorous discussion on 
agency conflicts. In particular, rating agencies are accused of having made unrealistic 
assumptions on structured finance products to issue inflated AAA ratings. Rating agencies admit 
that their correlation assumptions were too low, but maintain that the assumptions were 
extrapolated from historical data and not biased by conflicting incentives. We analyze potential 
rating bias through a straightforward approach—we compare the assumptions used in the same 
CDO valuation model performed by two divisions within the same rating agency with different 
financial incentives. The ratings division interacts with clients and assigns CDO ratings. Their 
job is both to bring in business as well as adhere to high standards. A common concern in such a 
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business model is that the business side might be overly aggressive in their assumptions in order 
to gain market share. This might be particularly true in deals such as CDOs where complexity 
makes it difficult for others to easily verify rating quality in the short run. In contrast, the 
surveillance division monitors the performance of the CDO.  
Our results indicate that the surveillance team calculations were more accurate than those of 
the ratings team and also more economically meaningful for future performance. However, 
downgrading signals from surveillance results seem to be ignored. As we will discuss, our 
findings are consistent with the rating agency supporting inflated CDO ratings and inconsistent 
with other explanations regarding CDO completeness, timing, or collateral deterioration in 2007.  
Our paper adds to a growing literature on lapses in structured finance credit ratings. Adam 
Ashcraft, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, and James Vickery (2010) show that rating agencies failed 
to incorporate simple information into mortgage-backed securities ratings. Joshua D. Coval, 
Jakub W. Jurek, and Erik Stafford (2009a, and b) argue that CDO pricing should incorporate 
catastrophe risk and parameter uncertainty. John M. Griffin and Dragon Tang (2011) find that in 
granting AAA ratings a credit rating agency made large inflationary adjustments beyond their 
standard model.1
I. Rating Assumption Changes from New Issue to First Surveillance 
  
A. Brief Institutional Background 
Determining the credit quality of individual assets in the collateral pool and the default 
correlation between the assets that feed into the quantitative CDO evaluation model are two of 
the primary tasks of the ratings analysts. Assets currently rated by the rating agency are counted 
at face value while assets rated by a different rating agency are typically notched down. A rating 
                                                          
1  Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas, and Joel Shapiro (2009), Vasiliki Skreta and Laura Veldkamp (2009), and 
Francesco Sangiorgi and Chester S. Spatt (2010) examine credit rating shopping from a theoretical perspective.  
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analyst should analyze the credit quality of unrated assets. Rating agencies categorize collateral 
assets by sector and then use defined values for within- and across-type correlations. However, 
credit risk models do allow for these correlation assumptions to be customized. Adding to the 
challenge is the fact that the portfolio pool is often incomplete or partially ramped when CDO 
ratings are assigned. The ratings group must also foster the business relationships brought in by 
the sales team and interact with the investment bank underwriting the CDOs. A “Pre-Sale” 
and/or “New Issue” report is typically prepared by a ratings analyst and approved by a ratings 
committee around the time the rating is issued to facilitate the closing of the CDO.2
Rating agencies also promise continuous active surveillance after the initial credit rating on 
the CDO is assigned. The last section of S&P’s new issue and pre-sale reports discloses their 
surveillance policy: “The purpose of surveillance is to assess whether the rated notes are 
performing within the initial parameters and assumptions.” The surveillance analyst receives 
collateral information from trustees and monitors CDO performance. If surveillance reports 
indicate that current ratings are no longer appropriate, a rating review will be conducted and the 
CDO notes could be upgraded or downgraded. The first surveillance report generally arrives 
after the rating is initially assigned. 
  
Our focus is on the correlation and credit quality assumptions which are the key inputs of the 
CDO rating model. Both departments use the same ratings model. We call these inputs 
‘assumptions’, but they are quantitative in the sense that rating agencies have a set of standard 
procedures to assign these values. Hence they are summary measures of the correlation and 
collateral quality, but judgment could play a role in the calculation process. From what is written 
in the press and from our discussions with industry insiders, we expect the ratings committee to 
                                                          
2 Other details of the rating and modeling process can be found in Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a and b), Efraim 
Benmelech and Jennifer Dlugosz (2009), and Griffin and Tang (2011).  
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have more discretion than the surveillance group—the surveillance group is more reminiscent of 
a compliance or risk management division. While a surveillance department may be forced to 
corroborate the ratings department, they should have some autonomy and may not fully 
communicate with the ratings group.  
B. Data and Basic Statistics 
We obtain data from one of the three leading credit rating agencies, including two sets of 
reported CDO assumptions and outputs. One is machine- and hand-collected from pre-sale and 
new issue reports when the CDO was issued to investors at the closing time. The other 
information is collected from an online credit rating agency database containing the first 
surveillance reports when the CDO is fully operating. (Part of the data is used by Griffin and 
Tang (2011).) The intersection of the two data sources leaves 595 CDOs with both rating 
assumptions available. However, to focus on information that is timely, we restrict the dataset to 
the 355 CDOs with surveillance reports dated within 180 days of the initial rating assignment. 
Results for the full sample are similar and shown in the Online Appendix. The correlation 
measure reported by the rating agency is the ratio between the standard deviation of the CDO 
pool under the assumed correlation structure relative to the standard deviation of a CDO pool 
with completely uncorrelated assets. Aggregate portfolio risk is represented by the simulation 
output known as the scenario default rate (SDR). The AAA SDR is the portfolio loss expected to 
occur with a probability equal to the historical default frequency of AAA-rated corporate bonds. 
The changes in correlation measure and average collateral rating between the first 
surveillance reports and the initial rating reports are plotted in Panel A of Figure 1. The figure 
shows that more correlation measure changes are positive (58.6 percent) as compared to negative 
(38.9 percent), indicating that the surveillance group estimates a higher default correlation than 
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that used by the ratings group. Both the mean and median differences are highly statistically 
significant as reported in Table 1. On average, the correlation measure increases from rating 
assignment to the first surveillance report by a statistically significant 0.116, which implies an 
economically large 14.9 percent increase in the correlation level.3
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Changes in Collateral Assumptions from Rating Assignment to First Surveillance. 
Notes: Illustrated are histograms for changes in collateral assumptions from rating assignment 
reports to first surveillance reports. The left panel illustrates changes in the default correlation 
measure (CM) assumption. The right panel illustrates changes in the weighted average rating 
(WAR) assumption. CM changes are in difference. WAR changes are in number of notches. The 
reporting gap is within 180 days. The sample covers 355 CDOs issued between 2002 and 2007.  
Table 1 shows that the surveillance group calculates much more pessimistic collateral credit 
quality than that assumed by the ratings team. The surveillance group calculates collateral ratings 
that are one or more notches worse than that estimated by the ratings team for 36.8 percent of 
CDOs and collateral ratings one or more notches better in only 9.9 percent of CDOs, as shown 
by Panel B of Figure 1. On average, the surveillance group’s collateral rating is lower by a 
statistically significant one-third of a notch.  
                                                          
3 The average issuing report correlation measure is 1.78. For the percentage calculation we subtract one since an 
asset with zero correlation will have a correlation measure of one.  
Change in CM 
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Change in WAR 
Panel B: Difference in Weighted Average 
Rating from Surveillance to Issuing Reports 
Panel A: Difference in Correlation Measure 
from Surveillance to Issuing Reports 
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Table 1 
Changes in Assumptions and Outputs from Rating Assignment to First Surveillance 
Report 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the changes in the collateral assumptions and 
outputs from rating assignment reports to first surveillance reports. The reporting time gap is 
within 180 days. Sample CDOs are issued between 2002 and 2007. The first row in Panel A 
reports changes in the default correlation measure assumption. The second row reports changes 
in the weighted average rating assumption in number of notches. Panel B reports changes in 
scenario default rate (SDR). CM changes are in difference. Scenario Default Rate changes are in 
raw values. Column ‘p-val’ tests the likelihood of the positive/negative split relative to a null of 
p=.5.  
 
II. Are the Correlation and Collateral Quality Changes Structural? 
If changes in the correlation and collateral quality assumptions are offset by changes 
elsewhere in the CDO structure (such as maturity), these changes would not affect the risk of the 
CDO. Changes in collateral assumptions feed directly into the assessment of portfolio risk, such 
as the scenario default rate. Panel B of Table 1 reports the AAA SDR. For the sample with SDRs 
we find that the first surveillance report SDRs are 1.6 percent higher than those in the initial 
ratings reports. The average SDR in the ratings reports is 32.5 percent. The 1.6 percent increase 
in SDR represents a five percent increase in portfolio risk assessed by the surveillance analysts. 
In Online Appendix Table OA.4 regressions indicate that an increase in correlation measure and 
deterioration in average collateral quality are indeed strongly related to the SDR increase. Hence, 
it does not seem that the correlation increases and average collateral quality changes are made up 
   Panel A     
 N Mean t-stat Median  % Positive % Negative p-val 
∆ Correlation Measure 355 0.116 (2.74) 0.04 58.6% 38.9% 0.0002 
∆ Weighted Average Rating  353 -0.377 (-4.79) 0.00 9.9% 36.8% 0.0000 
   Panel B     
∆ Scenario Default Rate  298 0.016 (3.46) 0.01 59.7% 40.3% 0.0009 
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for elsewhere in the CDO structure. Additionally, this analysis indicates that these changes in 
assumptions lead to more risky CDOs than released to investors at the time of the initial rating.  
We consider several possible explanations for the changes in the correlation measure and 
collateral quality. First, one straightforward potential reason for observing higher correlation and 
lower credit quality in surveillance than issuance reports is that the collateral pool changed 
between reports. Collateral composition change is more likely when the collateral pool is less 
ramped up at the issuing stage. Panel A of Table OA.2 shows that even for near fully and fully 
ramped CDOs, the changes in correlation and collateral quality are still significant. Surprisingly, 
the group with the lowest ramp-up fractions has smaller changes, although the sample size is 
much smaller. Second, collateral composition is more likely to change if the time between 
issuance and surveillance is longer. In Panel B of Table OA.2, we find that collateral quality 
deterioration is larger for longer time gaps, but the change in correlation is similar for the time 
gap of 0-3 months and 3-6 months. Third, the information environment could have changed from 
issuance to surveillance because of the mortgage market deterioration in 2007. We separately 
report the changes in 2007 and pre-crisis in Panel C of Table OA.2 and find that differences in 
correlations and especially collateral quality are large prior to 2007. We report changes in the 
correlation measure and weighted average rating over time in Figure OA.7 and find that the 
changes in correlation were about zero initially but became increasingly positive from 2005 to 
2007.  
Additionally, it is interesting to relate the findings to the type of deal. Sangiorgi and Spatt 
(2010) show that rating bias would only arise in an opaque environment for CDO ratings.4
                                                          
4 ABS CDOs and CDOs of CDOs are arguably more complex than plain vanilla CDOs based on bonds and loans 
(CBOs and CLOs). However, the underlying collateral for ABS CDOs and CDO2s has often been previously rated, 
 Panel 
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D of Table OA.2 shows that the correlation increase is most prevalent in ABS CDOs. Collateral 
quality differences are negative and similar for ABS CDOs, CLOs, and CDO2s. Thus, while 
complexity for CDOs in general could have a role in the difference between the two groups, it is 
not clear that differential complexity within CDOs plays a role. 
Hence, the changes in collateral quality and correlation assumptions are materially important 
but not explained by collateral composition changes, time between reports, or rapid changes in 
market conditions.  
III. Implications of Assumption Changes 
It is unclear whether the assumption changes between reports are economically important. 
The future performance of CDOs will detail which group, issuance or surveillance, is more 
accurate, and whether CDO investors are materially affected by those systematic changes in 
assumptions. Following Griffin and Tang (2011), we collect the rating changes for originally 
AAA-rated CDO tranches.5
Table 2 reports the ordered logistic regression results with the number of notches 
downgraded from AAA as the dependent variable. The change in assumed correlation 
significantly positively predicts future downgrading. This indicates that the surveillance team 
was more correct than the ratings analyst team. The odds ratio of 2.05 indicates that the odds of 
being downgraded is 2.05 times greater when the rating analysts’ under-estimation is one unit 
below the surveillance analyst. The specifications are also robust to controls for CDO type and 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
while CLOs seem likely to contain a higher proportion of unrated underlying loans that require more subjective 
evaluation of collaterals. 
5 For CDOs with multiple AAA-rated tranches, we count the worst rating downgrading. The AAA downgrade 
ranges from 0 if the AAA rating is maintained throughout the life of the CDO to 21 if the tranche has defaulted. 
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vintage. The change in the SDR is similarly significant. 6
Table 2 
 These findings are quite robust as 
shown with hazard models, ordered probit, plain probit, and OLS (Tables OA.8 and OA.9). 
 Rating Assumption Changes Predicting AAA Downgrading 
 
 
(1) (2) 
∆ Correlation Measure 2.05 
(3.77)  
∆ Weighted Average Rating 0.99 
(-0.13)  
∆ Weighted Average Maturity 1.14 
(1.44)  
Change in SDR  830.09 
  (3.33) 
ABS CDO 19.19 19.35 
 (9.54) (8.59) 
CDO2 3.81 5.82 
 (1.33) (1.77) 
Year 2004 0.44 0.31 
 (-0.97) (-1.21) 
Year 2005 1.71 1.71 
 (0.82) (0.69) 
Year 2006 2.94 2.86 
 (1.69) (1.38) 
Year 2007 3.20 3.19 
 (1.73) (1.48) 
Number of Obs. 347 294 
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.147 
Notes: This table reports ordered logistic regression results. The dependent variable is the 
number of notches downgraded from the initial AAA ratings. Independent variables are changes, 
from rating assignment to first surveillance, in the default correlation measure (CM) assumption, 
the weighted average rating (WAR) assumption, the weighted average maturity (WAM) 
assumption, and scenario default rate (SDR). Reported are odds ratios and z-statistics in 
parenthesis.  
 
Assumption changes would be irrelevant if investors do not rely on rating agency 
assumptions or fully anticipate surveillance changes. We find that the market spreads at issuance 
did not seem to reflect the future information that the SDR or the correlation and collateral 
quality assumptions would deteriorate (in Table OA.10). 
                                                          
6 Because the change in the correlation measure is so strongly related to the change in SDR, one faces problems with 
colinearity when including both variables, but we find that the change in the correlation measure prevails. 
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Why is surveillance analysis more accurate? It may simply be that surveillance analysts have 
more resources or are more talented. However, common perception is that ratings analysts 
received higher compensation and more staffing than surveillance teams. Surveillance analysts 
are less influenced by conflicts of interest, and hence could make more objective assumptions.  
If the rating agency had new information from the surveillance group and acted on it then it 
would indicate that the rating agency was learning from the surveillance team and trying to 
correct mistakes made by the ratings group. However, if the ratings agency did not act on 
information coming from the surveillance group, then this would indicate that the firm was 
compromising its standards. Since the AAA SDR increases for some deals, we can assess 
whether an increase in the SDR would have mattered for the rating agencies’ key rating criteria.  
We examine if the break-even default rate (BDR) from the cash flow model is greater than 
the SDR as discussed by Griffin and Tang (2011). Although our surveillance data does not 
contain a BDR, we evaluate the surveillance team SDR relative to the BDR in the issuing reports. 
If the BDR decreases for a deteriorating CDO (a natural case), our estimation for BDRs from 
issuing reports will be too high and lead to fewer rejections than if we had surveillance BDRs. 
Nevertheless, we still find that 19.7 percent of CDOs have at least one AAA tranche (and 20.1 
percent of tranches) that fails to pass the test for granting an AAA rating. We verify that those 
CDO tranches were not downgraded before the first surveillance date. Hence, it seems that these 
CDO tranches would not have warranted the ‘AAA’ rating. If rating agencies did indeed ignore 
such important surveillance information, it provides strong evidence that the firm was going 
beyond their stated standards. 
IV. Summary and Discussion 
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We find that assigned CDO ratings at issuance by the ratings group are based on more 
aggressive assumptions than the surveillance calculations after issuance. This difference does not 
appear to be explained by changes in collateral composition, the length of time between reports, 
or the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. Changes in collateral assumptions by the 
surveillance group predict future downgrading. Hence, the surveillance reports, although they 
appear shortly after issuance, are more accurate than the rating issuance reports. 
Consistent with the conflicts of interest hypothesis, the assumptions were more favorable in 
the group which brought in the business and interacted directly with the investment banks.  Also 
consistent with trying to maintain high ratings, the rating agency did not seemingly act on 
downgrading signals from the surveillance department. Since the breakdown in CDO credit 
ratings was at the heart of the credit crisis of 2007-2009, our findings suggest that conflicts of 
interest may be much more economically important than previously surmised. 
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